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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
G M. CHAMBERS and
NDA C CHAMBERS,

1-:R,; I

l l

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Supreme Court No. 19252

vs

SMITHFIELD CITY and
ROBERT RICHARDSON,
Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Plaintiffs as agrieved parties
for the plenary review of Defendant Smithfield City's decision
granting Defendant Robert Richardson's variance request.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion for summary

<Jruv\.ted

judgment andlDefendants' motions for summary judgment, approving
the variance and the procedure by which it was granted.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs/Appellants (hereinafter "Plaintiffs")
seek a reversal of the lower court's summary judgment and remand
with directions for entry of judgment in Plaintiffs' favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Sometime prior to March of 1982, Defendant/Respondent

Robert Richardson (hereinafter "Richardson") purchased a .67 acre
lot located at approximately 380 South 200 West in Smithfield,
Utah.

Record p. 15 (hereinafter Record is denoted "R. ").

- 2 2.

Prior to Richardson's purchase, the .67 acre lot
The prior owner divided

was part of a one acre lot (R.

50)

the acre by selling the north

67 acre

3.

to Richardson (R. 47, 53

The lot sold to Richardson (hereinafter "the prop-

erty") was and is located in an RE-1 zone, which requires a
'l

minimum area of one acre for building (R. 1, '11).
is "restricted," (K.

The property

20, 47, 50), in that a residence was alread·

located on the balance of the original one acre lot when the
subject .67 acre property was sold to Richardson (R. 46).
4.

At the time Richardson purchased the property, he

was aware of the one acre minimum building requirement imposed
by the RE-1 zone (R. 54).
5.

The RE-1 zone is a "buffer" zone between residentia.

and agricultural zones (R. 40, 45, 53).

The RE-1 zone allows

for residential use (with one acre minimum lot required) and
some animal use (R. 54)
6.

On March 11, 1982, Richardson proposed to Defendant

Smithfield City (hereinafter "the City") that the property be
rezoned from the RE-1 zone to an RE-1-12 zone to allow for construction of a single family dwelling (R. 15, 78).

Hearing on

the application was held March 17, 1983 (R. 45), and on April
7, 1982, Richardson withdrew his rezone application at the City's
instruction (R. 47, 53).

All of these proceedings were before

the City's Planning and Zoning Commission (hereinafter "the
Zoning Cornrnissiori).
7.

On April 15, 1982, Richardson applied to the City's

Board of Adjustments (hereinafter "the Board") for a variance whic
would allow him to build a residence on the property (R.

15, 16).

- 3 -

On May 27, 1982, the Board approved (three to one) Richardson's
request (R. 16, 54).
8.

On June 16, 1982, Richardson applied to the Zoning

Commission for an adjustment along the same lines as the one
approved by the Board of Adjustments (R. 50).

The Zoning Co=ission

unanimously voted to "reco=end approval" of the application
(R. 50).
9.

On June 23, 1982, Richardson presented the variance

application to the City Council (R. 17).

After considering the

actions taken by the other two administrative bodies, the City
Council voted three to two to approve the variance request (R. 40).
10. The procedure followed by Richardson in obtaining
approval for his variance request was required by and in compliance
with the provisions in Chapter 4-2 of the Smithfield City Ordinances
as amended by Ordinanace 1-85 (R. 17).
11. All of the findings made by the Board, the Co=ission
or the Council are contained in a "Findings of Fact" printed
sheet with notations, which is found in the record at pages 57
and 85.
I.

THE CITY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO GRANT THE VARIANCE.
The threshold and primary substantive issue presented

by this appeal is whether the board of adjustments was within its
autho~

in approving Richardson's variance request.

For pur-

poses of this point only, Plaintiffs treat the board of adjustments as: having made the variance decision (See Point IIa below).
If, as Plaintiffs claim and will show, the Board had no power
to grant the variance, then the trial court erred in upholding

- 4 the variance and its summary judgment should be reversed by this
Court.
The powers of Municipal boards of adjustment are define
in Section 10-9-12, Utah Code Annotated.

Subsection 10-9-12(3)

gives the board power to authorize variances only upon compliance
with specified conditions.
"The board of adjustments shall have the following
powers: . . .
(3) To authorize upon appeal such variance from
the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary
to the public interest, where owing to special conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions of
the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship;
provided that the spirit of the ordinance shall be
observed and substantial justice done.
Before any
variance may be authorized, however, it shall be
shown that:
(a) The variance will not substantially affect
the comprehensive plan of zoning in the City and
that adherence to the strict letter of the ordinance
will cause difficulties and hardships, the
imposition of which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in order to carry out the general purpose of the plan.
(b) Special circumstances attached to the property covered by the application which do not
generally apply to the other property in the same
district.
(c) That because special circumstances, property
covered by the application is deprived of the
privileges possessed by other properties in the
same district; and that the granting of the variance
is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial
property right possessed by other property in the
same district."
Section 10-9-12, U.C.A.

Since the City cannot, by ordinance,

expand the powers granted in the enabling statute, Section
10-9-12(3) defines the widest possible range of the board's
discretion.

Furthermore, the board lacks jurisdiction to grant

- 5 a variance request which fails to meet the minimum statutory
requirements.
~ent,

Ariz.

See Ivancovich v. City of Tuscon Board of AdjustApp, 529 P.2d 242 at 247 (1975).

A deficiency in any one of the minimum requirements of
the statute deprives the board of power to grant a variance.

For

instance, if an applicant has demonstrated that strict adherence
to the ordinance will create difficulties and hardships, but he
fails to show any special circumstances attached to the property,
the board cannot grant his request for a variance.
In the present case, the board lacked authority to grant
Richardson's request.

The variance did not even meet one of the

statutorily prescribed minimum tests, let alone all of them as
required.

There is no evidence to support the City's decision.

See Points IA through IC.
The City's lack of power to grant the variance
translates into clear error on the part of the trial court.
"We hold therefore that . . . the order of the
Board of Adjustment and the judgment of the
District Court are both made without authority
of law."
Walton v. Tracy Loan
at 729 (1939).

& Trust

Company, 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724

Plaintiffs submit that in reviewing the variance

decisions of a board of adjustments, the district court should
presume its decision to be "regular," and should uphold the
decision of the board if there is "substantial evidence" to
support it.

See Banks v. Kodiak City Council, Alaska, 628 P.2d

927 (1981).

The same standard has been held to apply to appellate

review of the lower court's ruling on the variance.

- 6 "In reviewing a district court's judgment, as
above, this court wil 1, in the first instance
.make the same review nf Lhe administrative
tribunal's action as does the district court."
Stice v. Gribben-Allen Motors, Inc., Parsons, Kan., 534 P.2d 126
at 1271 (1975).
The error of the trial court was compounded by the fact
that in the proceedings before the City, Richardson had the bur~
of showing his entitlement to a variance.
Portland, Or. App., 496 P.2d 726 (1972).

Erickson v. City of
In a typical variance

case, the burden of proof shifts from the applicant before the
board to the petitioner who seeks judicial relief.

But in this

case, thio trial court granted summary judgment in Defendants'
favor.

This Court must, therefore, construe the evidence in the

light most favorable to Plaintiffs.
The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the record,
no matter what standard of review is employed, is that the variar..
should not and could not have been granted, having failed to meet
one or more of the statucory requisites.

The trial court's

summary judgment was likewise erroneous and was premature beside;
A.

The Variance Violates the Spirit of the Ordinance.
The first and most important requirement the enabling

act imposes on variance requests is "that the spirit of the
ordinance shall be observed."

Section 10-9-12(3), U.C.A.

The

idea that the variance cannot substantially deviate from the
ordinance is also expressed in the statute as follows:

the

board has power to authorize "such variance from the terms of the
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest,"
Section 10-9-12(3), U.C.A.; and "the variance will not sub-

- 7 .stantJally affect the comprehensive plan of zoning of the City,"
Sect-Lon 10-9-12(3) (a),

The statute leaves the board of adjustment$

powerless to grant anything other than a minor deviation from the
,;oning ordinance.

The variance here granted constituted a

significant departure from the zoning ordinance and should be
struck down on this ground alone.
In Walton v. Tracy Loan

& Trust

Co., 97 Utah 249, 92

P.2d 724 (1939), the Utah Supreme Court declared a variance to
be illegal as a substantial departure from the zoning ordinance.
In the proceedings below both the Defendants and the Court
distinguished the Walton case on the basis that Walton dealt with
a "use variance," whereas the present case is an "area variance."
Although the distinction exists, both "area" and "use" variances
must meet the same statutory requirements; the statute makes no
distinction between "use" and "area" variance.

The proposition

of Walton was that a variance in use is per se violative of the
spirit of the ordinance, and as to the board of adjustments,
is an ultra vires act.

See Walton, 92 P.2d at 729.

The basis

for the holding, in part, was that the board could not, by
variance, effect a rezone as zoning was a legislative function
and the board was merely an administrative agency:
"Any variance in use to the extent such land 1s
in effect a rezoning or the placing of such
land in a different zone than that in which
the Commission by ordinance had placed it .
Walton, P.2d at 727.
The Walton case is helpful not only because it
establishes some general guidelines as to what constitutes a
violation of the spirit of the ordinance, but also because in

- 8 dicta, the court outlines the kind of "minor deviations" from
the ordinances that are the prope1 subject of a variance.
"Can the Board then grant a variance in use or
is it confined to variances in building and construction details within specified uses? . . . If,
however, the powers of the Board are limited to
minor and practical difficulties, to such variations in detail and construction as the
Inspector himself might have allowed rather than
to use, the statute and set up are harmonious
throughout.
. and the purpose and spirit of
zoning laws preserved.
.And this interpretation
of the statute is in accordance with the great
weight of authority." ,
(f:'!}'IQi-1lGI~ w_ddt.d _)
Walton, 92 P. 2d at 727. ' Variances are within the power of the
Board

<:?_~

if they concern building and construction details

which the building inspector himself might waive.
ln the present case,

the variance permits Richardson

to build a home on two thirds of an acre, where the minimum lot
size is one acre.

This is not a minor "detail" which the

building inspector might overlook in granting a permit.

This

variance violates the spirit and purpose of the ordinance by
in effect downzoning the lot from an RE-1 zone to a zone in which
the same uses are permitted but the minimum lot size is reduced.
The RE-1 zone is classified with reference to two major criteria,
use and minimum lot size.

The set back and yard requirements

are not made part of the classification, because these matters
are details.

Where the only distinction between the Re:-1 zone

and other zones is the minimum lot size, it cannot be said the
minimum lot size is a minor "detail of construction."
Plaintifb

concede~

that if the applicant had conflictiR

surveys with regard to lot size, or had 99 percent of an acre,
a variance might not violate the spirit of the ordinance.

But

- 9 here Richardson would have the board of adjustment lop off a full
rh1rd of the minimum area required by the ordinance.
"Un uestionabl the re uested variance from the
. . . requirement that there bf a ot area of not
less than 6,000 square feet . . . so that this
applicant might use this . . . 3,000-square-foot
lot for single-family dwelling purposes, would
undul and in a ver marked de ree conflict"With
t at speci ic provision o the or inance, an
would be against the public interest as declared
therein, as well as contrary to the spirit of the
ordinance. .
"
_ \
1
1
Cevvi p~\U~; s ULJda1_,,;
1
Brown v. Fraser, Okl., 467 P.2d 464 at 469 (1970).
The elimination
of one third of the lot requirement would likewise be contrary
to the spirit of the ordinance.

See Abel v. Zoning Board of

Appeals, Conn., 374 A.2d 227 (1977).
The "findings" of the Board are not helpful with regard
to determining whether the spirit of the ordinance is maintained
by the variance (R. 85).
are merely a checklist.

As pointed out below, the "findings"
Findings ld through lg pay homage to

the principle of preserving the spirit of the ordinance, but
there is absolutely no evidence to support those findings.

The

only discussion of the spirit of the ordinance with regard to
this variance was the objection which was repeatedly raised on
the basis that the RE-1 zone was a "buffer zone" and that the
allowance of higher residential density than one home per acre
violated the spirit of such a "buffer" between agricultural
and residential uses (R. 40, 45, 53).

The "findings" were merely

self serving conclusions of the various City bodies, and as such
have little bearing on the issue.

This Court must look past

those conclusions and must independently examine the record to
see if the spirit of the ordinance was violated.

See Ivancovich

10 v. City of Tucson Board of Adjustment, Ariz., App.
242 (1975).

529 P.2d

The record discloses that the variance conflicts

with the expressed intent ot the ordinance.
That the spirit of che ordinance has been violated by
the variance is demonstrated not only by the variance as compared
to the ordinance, but also by the way in which the variance was
approved.

The record clearly reflects that the variance was

employed as an improper substitute for rezoning.
In Lovell v. Planning Com'n of City of Independence,
Or. App., 586 P.2d 99 (1978), the Court

struc~

down a variance

wh1c], would have allowed construction on an area "less than the
minimums specified for this R-1 single family residence zone."
The Board had found that "(T)he degree of variance in this case
is a reasonable amount of square footage for proper building."
Lovell, a86 P.2d at 100.

The Court implicitly found the variance

to he in conflict with the zoning ordinance and directed the
City's attention to the proper remedy:
.if the City believes the lot size that
would be left after the proposed partitioning
is sufficient for its R-1 residential areas,
then it should change its zoning restrictions
to reflect that belief.
Variances should
not be employed as a substitute for the normal
legislative process of amending zoning regulations."
Lovell, 586 P.2d at 101.
In the present case, Richardson began the process of
obtaining approval for construction by requesting a rezone of hL
lot.

See Statement of Fact, paragraph 6.

It is important to

note that Richardson switched his approach to a variance procedu:
only after the City convinoed him that a variance would accompli 2
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the same result, but with substantially less difficulty (R. 47).
The City had apparently superimposed variance ("special questions")
standards over certain types of rezone requests, which rendered
variance requests procedurally and substantively less difficult
in those "special questions" cases.

This improper channelling

of Richardson's rezone request into the variance procedure points
out the substance of Richardson's request and the variance as
granted:

It constitutes a substantive amendment to the zoning

ordinance as to that lot and as such is invalid.

The City

further revealed the rezone character of the request when the
Planning and Zoning Commission stated:
"It was felt this is a residential area
and one home on .67 of an acrea was
reasonable." (R. 50).
If the City felt the area was residential and that .67 of an
acre was a reasonable size for a lot in that area "then it should
change its zoning restrictions to reflect that belief."
586 P.2d at 101.

Lovell,

The variance, however, was not a proper remedy

for Richardson and should be struck down.

The district court

erred in upholding the variance because the variance violates the
public policy as expressed in the zoning ordinance.
B.

There Are No Special Circumstances Attached to the Property.
Under the enabling act the subject property must be

subject to special circumstances which are not generally attached
to other property in the same district.

Section 10-9-12(3)(b).

This requirement is both indepndent and prerequisite to the
"hardship" requirement.

See Section 10-9-12(3)(c), U.C.A.

In this respect the variance has no basis because
1) there is no evidence of special circumstances attached to

- 12 Richardson's property and 2) there is no evidence of the
difference between Richardson's property and other property in
the RE-1 district

The variance is

therefore, illegal as this

condition of the enabling act has not been satisfied.
In the present case, the Board unanimously found that
special circUlilstances attach to Richardson's property (R. 85,
finding li).

Plaintiffs are at a complete loss to fintl from the

record any evidence to support the Board's finding.

The trial

court likewise failed to identify any evidence that supported the
Board's findings.

See R. 87-89.

The clear import of Section

10- 9-12 ( 3) ( c) , U. C. A omd the--±-ti-s-t- o.f--any--_..._V-idence
~'

s

fi:n4ing-.

&upp=t- the

The tr brl-c-ourt--i±kew±se---far~B-identi-fy

-any ev-i4enee- tna_t_ supported- the £-ea-rcl-1-s- ftmtin-gs:
(-e-h-~A-:

w

See

l0~9-t20J

and the lack of any evidence of special circumstance,

attached to the Richardson property obviate the necessity of
further citation.
Even if Richardson had carried his burden of
demonstrating some "special circumstances" attached to his
property, he would not have satisfied the statutory requirement
"The data contained in the planning commission's
report focus almost exclusively on the qualities
of the property for which the variance was sought.
In the absence of comparative information about
surrounding properties, these data lack legal
significance.

Thus neither an administrative agency nor a reviewing
court may assume without evidentiary basis that the
character of neighboring property is different
from that of the land for which the variance is
sought."

- 13 lopanga Ass'n For A Scenic Corrnnunity v. County of Los Angeles,
l1C)74)

C:al , 522 P.2d 12 at 21, 22.

Again,

the record is completely

tlevoul of evidence of the circumstances attached to the

It should be noted here that the subto-\standard size of Richardson's is not a special circumstance
~11.rrounding

property.

within the meaning of Section 10-9-12(3) (c).

The lot is no

different than other substandard lots in the same zone.

See

Brown v. Fraser, Okl., 467 P.2d 464 at 469 (1970).
Having failed to bring forward any evidence of special
circumstances of the property which distinguish it from ot':i.er
parcels in the same district, Richardson must be denied the
variance which the City and the lower court granted him in
contradiction with the statute.
C.

The Variance Does Not Relieve Richardson From Any
Unnecessary Difficulties and Hardships.
Under Utah law, in order for a variance to be granted,

it must be shown that:
" . . . Adherence to the strict letter of the
ordinance will cause difficulties and hardships, the imposition of which upon the
petitioner is unnecessary in order to carry
out the general purpose of the plan."
Section 10-9-12(3)(a), U.C.A.

Subsection (3)(c) of the same

section restates this basic principle in terms of the preservation of a "substantial property right."
difficulties have been shown.
ships."

In this case, no

There is no evidence of "hard-

There is nothing in the record to support the finding

that "deprivation" of property rights has resulted from special
circumstances.
The applicant has the burden of showing that any

- 14 unnecessary difficulties and hardships would occur to him if the
ordinance were literally enforced
P.2d 464 (1970).

Brown v. Fraser, Okl., 467

In the proceedings below, Defendants argued

that their burden had been met by what they claimed was proof
of "practical difficulties."

They urged upon the trial court th,

"practical difficulties" standard based on their contention
such standard is appropriate in "area variance" cases.

tha~

The

language of the statute, however, establishes the standard to be
u,...\•. ',

'~'"'-\

"difficulties and hardships," Section 10-9-12(3)(a), U.C.A}, and
makes no distinction between "area" and "use" variances.
the ruling in Walton v. Tracy Loan

& Trust

Given

Co., 97 Utah 249, 92

P. 2d 724 ( 1939), that "use" variances are per se illegal as
rezoning by a non-legislative body, the remaining standards of
enabling statute, including "difficulties and hardships," can
only apply to what Defendants characterize as "area" variances.
This Court should flatly reject the "practical difficulties"
standard and adopt the "unnecessary hardship" and "difficulties
and hardships" standards contained in the clear langua3e of
Section 10-9-12(3), U.C.A.
Although the Board made a finding of "hardship," (See
R. 85, lh and lj) and the court found that the land would be
rendered useless without the variance (R. 83) , there is no
evidence of a cognizable "difficulty" or "hardship" which
Richardson might suffer.

The RE-1 zone permits some animal

uses on the land (See Findings of Fact 5), and the land was
apparently so employed prior to Richardson's purchase (R. 46).
Nothing in the record suggests Richardson can't use his lot
without a home on it.

~
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The Corrnnission and the Court apparently assumed the
z.oning restriction might impair or reduce the value of Richardson's
lot.

Although nothing contained in the record justifies this

speculation, Plaintiffs will admit, for purposes of argument, that
rhe variance would enhance the value of the lot.

That fact,

even if shown, would not constitute a "hardship."
"Although we have not had prior occasion to
construe our variance statute, it is of a
variety commonly found in other states. A
finding of unnecessary hardship or the
equivalent is universally required, and the
universal rule is that the financial loss or
the potential financial advantage to the
applicant is not the proper basis for a
variance." (citations omitted).
Stice v. Gribben-Allen Motor, Inc., Parsons, Kan., 534 P. 2d
1267 at 1272 (1875).

There is no evidence that lacking the

variance Richardson would suffer any "difficulty" or "hardship."
The trial Court therefore erred in granting summary judgment.
Plaintiffs additionally claim that even if Richardson
had carried his burden of proving "unnecessary hardship," the
variance would be improper under the doctrine of "self-created

hardsip"~~-

Although this doctrine is not expressly

made part of the statute, most Courts read into the variance
proceedings this additional consideration.
ordinance apparently

The Smithfield City

contemplates application of the "self-

created hardship" doctrine in variance cases, as evidenced by
"finding" lk (R. 85).

Defendants argued, and the trial court

agreed, that the self-created hardship doctrine was inapplicable
because Richardson did not "create" the hardship (R. 83).

The

"self-created hardship" doctrine is properly applied, however,
where the alleged "hardship" is voluntarily acquired:

- 16 "As was mentioned above, the Board denied Levy's
request for a variance on the ground that Levy's
hardship, if any, was "self-inflicted" in that
she purchased the subject property consisting of
only one and one-quarter acres,
with either
actual or constructive nolice that existing
zoning regulations required that a single family
residence be built on no less than two and onehalf acres.

Without deciding whether 'self-inflicted hardship'
is in and of itself an absolute J.ar to the
granting of a variance, it is at the very least
a highly significant fact which.
. is a 'material
element bearing on the issue and weighs heavily
against the owner seeking the variance.'"
Levy v. Board of Adjustment of Arapehoe County, Colo., 369 P.2d
(1%L)

991.

In the present case, the finding of the.Board and the Cour:

that the "self-created hardship" doctrine did not apply was not
only unsupported by the evidence, but was directly contrary to
the evidence in the record (See Finding of Fact 4).
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE PROCEDURE BY
WHICH THE VARIANCE WAS GRANTED.
Pursuant to Smithfield City Ordinance, a variance reques

is submitted for "recorrnnendation" to the Board of Adjustments and
the Planning

& Zoning

Commission.

The ordinance purports to vest

the City Council with authority to grant variances in appropriate
cases after the "recommendations" have been made by the other
two principal agencies (R. 25).
under Section 10-9-12, U.C.A.

This procedure is not allowed

This Court should declare Smithfie:

City Ordinance 4-2-d.6 to be invalid as conflicting with the
enabling statute.

The Smithfield City procedure contradicts

the enabling act in that it bestows upon the City Council the
ultimate decision-making power with regard to variances.

- 17 Defendants and the trial court relied heavily upon
Thurston v. Cache County, Utah, 626 P,2d 446 (1981) to support
their view that the Smithfield procedure comports with the
enabling act.

Their reliance is misplaced because in Thurston

this Court addressed a different enabling statute (county as
opposed to city), and an entirely distinct procedure (conditional
use permit as opposed to variance).

Plaintiffs agree that a

County may, by ordinance, reserve to its legislative body the
power to grant conditional use permits.

This does not mean,

however, that a City may, by ordinance, reserve to its legislative
body the power to grant variances.
In the present case, the enabling statute gives to the
Board of Adjustments the power to grant variances.
10-9-12(3).

See Section

The power to grant variances is given to no other

municipal body.

This power is not made dependent upon the

legislative body "optional" provisions for the Board's exercise
of its power as was the case in Thurston.
P.2d at 445, 446.

See Thurston, 626

That the Board of Adjustments is the only

body invested with the power to grant variances "is clear
from the statutory language."
This principle is not only clear from the statute,

rt is implicit in the entire framework of municipal zoning.
First, the Enabling Statute requires that municipalities
who wish to avail themselves of zoning powers create a Board
of Adjustments.

Section 10-9-6, U.C.A.

If the Board were totally

dependent upon municipal ordinances to determine when it had
the powers ostensibly given by state law, the requirement that
cities have such boards would be rendered meaningless.

- 18 Second, the zoning system established by the Enabling
Act contemplates a Board c,f AdjustmenL which sits as an appellat,
body within the rnunic:cpality.

The Smithfield Ordinance creates

the untenable situation where an appeal to the Board would be
taken from a decision which the Board had already recommended
and approved.
Third. :he Smithfield Ordinance places one who seeks
judicial review of a variance in a "catch 22" dilemma.

Section

10-9-15, Utah Code Annotated provides for appeal from the Board's
J~~i•i0n within 30 days.

By the time the Board's decision is ma~

-:i11a_ (by the City Council) it is likely the time for appeal has
passed.

But if judicial review is sought irmnediately after the

Board passes on the variance, the argument might well be raised
that such review is premature as the City Council could deny
the variance.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend the Smithfield Ordinance
as now constituted lacks adequate provisions for notice.

The

Defendants' ~nd the Court's response to this contention is that
Plaintiffs received actual notice of the proceedings and that
their interests were represented at the administrative hearings.
Although Plaintiffs agree that lack of notice may have been
"cured" in this case. the deficiencies in the notice point to
the ordinance's overall lack of compliance with statutory
requirements.
The Smithfield ordinance creates a variance procedure
which is disjointed, unnecessarilv repetitive and confusing.

- 19 :i.bove all, the procedure is contrary to the guidelines and
1.oning framework mandated by the Utah State Legislature.

The

c•rdinance should therefore be struck down by this Court, the
DLstrict Court having failed to do so by its ruling on the parties'
motions for surmnary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Smithfield City erred in granting Richardson's variance
request.

The variance violated the spirit of the zoning ordinance

and constituted a rezoning in variance clothing.

There was no

showing that Richardson's property had special circumstances or
that his property was any different than the surrounding property.
There was no showing that Richardson suffered any hardships or
difficulties before the variance was granted.

The District

Court erred in refusing to grant Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment because there were no facts in the record to
support Defendants' position.

Likewise, the lower court erred

in granting summary judgment for Defendants.

Finally, the

procedure employed by Smithfield City in variance~ cases is so
contrary to the enabling statute that it must be struck down, the
Thurston case notwithstanding.

For all of the above reasons

this Court should reverse and remand to the District Court with
directions to vacate the variance.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of September, 1983.
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~l~
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Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellants
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